System and method for protecting against tampering with a security device

ABSTRACT

A lock for securing an electronic device includes a tamper module and a destruction module. The tamper module determines whether a component of the lock has been compromised. The tamper module may determine whether a cable securing the electronic device has been cut. If the tamper module determines that a lock component has been compromised, a destruction module may destroy an enabling component that enables the electronic device to operate. The destruction module may destroy a transmitter in the lock that communicates an authentication code if the electronic device will not function without the authentication code.

BACKGROUND

1. Field

The subject matter disclosed herein relates to security devices forelectronic devices and to preventing tampering with security devices.

2. Description of the Related Art

Electronics are becoming increasingly light, portable, and widespreadamong consumers. Many users favor laptop computers for theirportability. Cellular phones are being designed to perform increasinglycomplex tasks. Electronic book readers, tablets, and other electronicdevices are becoming increasingly prevalent. These electronic devicesoften represent a substantial investment by the owner. In addition,these electronic devices often contain sensitive personal information,such as credit card numbers, social security numbers, addresses, andother information, within them.

Even if an electronic device is locked, there is still a risk that athief may break the lock and steal the electronic device. Sounding analarm if the lock is broken may not stop the thief; in a public place,people may be unwilling to confront the thief even if they know that heis stealing the electronic device. Other approaches may inadequatelyprotect data from theft.

BRIEF SUMMARY

An approach to securing an electronic device is disclosed. The inventionmay be realized as an apparatus that includes a tamper module thatmonitors lock components of a lock that secures an electronic device.The tamper module may also determine whether any lock component has beencompromised. The apparatus may also include a destruction module thatdestroys an enabling component if the tamper module determines that oneof the lock components is compromised. An enabling component is acomponent that enables the electronic device to operate.

Certain lock components may also be enabling components, which arereferred to as enabling lock components. The destruction module maydestroy one or more enabling lock components if the tamper moduledetermines that a lock component is compromised. A device securitymodule may include a cable and share an authentication code with a datasecurity module. The device security module may be an enabling lockcomponent. The data security module may prevent the electronic devicefrom operating if the device security module is not coupled to theelectronic device, or if the authentication code is either incorrect ornot provided. The data security module may also be an enabling lockcomponent. The destruction module may destroy one of these components.The destruction module may destroy the device security module bydestroying an authentication code module of the device security module.

The tamper module may monitor a cable and determine that the cable iscompromised if the cable is severed. The tamper module may monitor thecable by monitoring the electrical resistance of the cable. The tampermodule may also monitor the casing for the device security module anddetermine that the device security module is compromised if the casingis opened.

The invention may be realized as a system that includes the devicesecurity module, data security module, tamper module, and destructionmodule referenced above. The invention may also be realized as a methodthat includes monitoring lock components of the lock securing theelectronic device, determining whether a lock component has beencompromised, and destroying an enabling component if the lock componentis compromised.

References throughout this specification to features, advantages, orsimilar language do not imply that all of the features and advantagesmay be realized in any single embodiment. Rather, language referring tothe features and advantages is understood to mean that a specificfeature, advantage, or characteristic is included in at least oneembodiment. Thus, discussion of the features and advantages, and similarlanguage, throughout this specification may, but do not necessarily,refer to the same embodiment.

Furthermore, the described features, advantages, and characteristics ofthe embodiments may be combined in any suitable manner. One skilled inthe relevant art will recognize that the embodiments may be practicedwithout one or more of the specific features or advantages of aparticular embodiment. In other instances, additional features andadvantages may be recognized in certain embodiments that may not bepresent in all embodiments.

These features and advantages of the embodiments will become more fullyapparent from the following description and appended claims, or may belearned by the practice of embodiments as set forth hereinafter.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order that the advantages of the embodiments of the invention will bereadily understood, a more particular description of the embodimentsbriefly described above will be rendered by reference to specificembodiments that are illustrated in the appended drawings. Understandingthat these drawings depict only some embodiments and are not thereforeto be considered to be limiting of scope, the embodiments will bedescribed and explained with additional specificity and detail throughthe use of the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is an illustration of one embodiment of a system including anelectronic device and a lock;

FIG. 2 is an illustration of one embodiment of a schematic block diagramof a lock coupled to an electronic device;

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram showing one embodiment of a lock;

FIG. 4 is an illustration showing one embodiment of a system with theelectronic device and lock components;

FIG. 5 is a flow chart diagram showing one embodiment of a method forsecuring an electronic device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, aspects of the presentinvention may be embodied as a system, method or computer programproduct. Accordingly, aspects of the present invention may take the formof an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment(including firmware, resident software, micro-code, etc.) or anembodiment combining software and hardware aspects that may allgenerally be referred to herein as a “circuit,” “module” or “system.”Furthermore, aspects of the present invention may take the form of acomputer program product embodied in one or more computer readablemedium(s) having computer readable program code embodied thereon.

Many of the functional units described in this specification have beenlabeled as modules, in order to more particularly emphasize theirimplementation independence. For example, a module may be implemented asa hardware circuit comprising custom VLSI circuits or gate arrays,off-the-shelf semiconductors such as logic chips, transistors, or otherdiscrete components. A module may also be implemented in microcode,firmware, or the like of programmable hardware devices such as fieldprogrammable gate arrays, programmable array logic, programmable logicdevices or the like.

Modules may also be implemented in software for execution by varioustypes of processors. An identified module of computer readable programcode may, for instance, comprise one or more physical or logical blocksof computer instructions which may, for instance, be organized as anobject, procedure, or function. Nevertheless, the executables of anidentified module need not be physically located together, but maycomprise disparate instructions stored in different locations which,when joined logically together, comprise the module and achieve thestated purpose for the module.

Indeed, a module of computer readable program code may be a singleinstruction, or many instructions, and may even be distributed overseveral different code segments, among different programs, and acrossseveral memory devices. Similarly, operational data may be identifiedand illustrated herein within modules, and may be embodied in anysuitable form and organized within any suitable type of data structure.The operational data may be collected as a single data set, or may bedistributed over different locations including over different storagedevices, and may exist, at least partially, merely as electronic signalson a system or network. Where a module or portions of a module areimplemented in software, the computer readable program code may bestored and/or propagated on in one or more computer readable medium(s).

The computer readable medium may be a tangible computer readable storagemedium storing the computer readable program code. The computer readablestorage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic,magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, holographic,micromechanical, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or anysuitable combination of the foregoing.

More specific examples of the computer readable medium may include butare not limited to a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a randomaccess memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmableread-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), a portable compact discread-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disc (DVD), a Blu-RayDisc (BD), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, aholographic storage medium, a micromechanical storage device, or anysuitable combination of the foregoing. In the context of this document,a computer readable storage medium may be any tangible medium that cancontain, and/or store computer readable program code for use by and/orin connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, ordevice.

The computer readable medium may also be a computer readable signalmedium. A computer readable signal medium may include a propagated datasignal with computer readable program code embodied therein, forexample, in baseband or as part of a carrier wave. Such a propagatedsignal may take any of a variety of forms, including, but not limitedto, electrical, electro-magnetic, magnetic, optical, or any suitablecombination thereof. A computer readable signal medium may be anycomputer readable medium that is not a computer readable storage mediumand that can communicate, propagate, or transport computer readableprogram code for use by or in connection with an instruction executionsystem, apparatus, or device. Computer readable program code embodied ona computer readable signal medium may be transmitted using anyappropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless, wireline,optical fibre cable, Radio Frequency (RF), or the like, or any suitablecombination of the foregoing.

In one embodiment, the computer readable medium may comprise acombination of one or more computer readable storage mediums and one ormore computer readable signal mediums. For example, computer readableprogram code may be both propagated as an electro-magnetic signalthrough a fibre optic cable for execution by a processor and stored onRAM storage device for execution by the processor.

Computer readable program code for carrying out operations for aspectsof the present invention may be written in any combination of one ormore programming languages, including an object oriented programminglanguage such as Java, Smalltalk, C++ or the like and conventionalprocedural programming languages, such as the “C” programming languageor similar programming languages. The computer readable program code mayexecute entirely on the user's computer, partly on the user's computer,as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user's computer andpartly on a remote computer or entirely on the remote computer orserver. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected tothe user's computer through any type of network, including a local areanetwork (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may bemade to an external computer (for example, through the Internet using anInternet Service Provider).

Reference throughout this specification to “one embodiment,” “anembodiment,” or similar language means that a particular feature,structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodimentis included in at least one embodiment. Thus, appearances of the phrases“in one embodiment,” “in an embodiment,” and similar language throughoutthis specification may, but do not necessarily, all refer to the sameembodiment, but mean “one or more but not all embodiments” unlessexpressly specified otherwise. The terms “including,” “comprising,”“having,” and variations thereof mean “including but not limited to,”unless expressly specified otherwise. An enumerated listing of itemsdoes not imply that any or all of the items are mutually exclusive,unless expressly specified otherwise. The terms “a,” “an,” and “the”also refer to “one or more” unless expressly specified otherwise.

Furthermore, the described features, structures, or characteristics ofthe embodiments may be combined in any suitable manner. In the followingdescription, numerous specific details are provided, such as examples ofprogramming, software modules, user selections, network transactions,database queries, database structures, hardware modules, hardwarecircuits, hardware chips, etc., to provide a thorough understanding ofembodiments. One skilled in the relevant art will recognize, however,that embodiments may be practiced without one or more of the specificdetails, or with other methods, components, materials, and so forth. Inother instances, well-known structures, materials, or operations are notshown or described in detail to avoid obscuring aspects of anembodiment.

Aspects of the embodiments are described below with reference toschematic flowchart diagrams and/or schematic block diagrams of methods,apparatuses, systems, and computer program products according toembodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block ofthe schematic flowchart diagrams and/or schematic block diagrams, andcombinations of blocks in the schematic flowchart diagrams and/orschematic block diagrams, can be implemented by computer readableprogram code. These computer readable program code may be provided to aprocessor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer,sequencer, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce amachine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor ofthe computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, createmeans for implementing the functions/acts specified in the schematicflowchart diagrams and/or schematic block diagrams block or blocks.

The computer readable program code may also be stored in a computerreadable medium that can direct a computer, other programmable dataprocessing apparatus, or other devices to function in a particularmanner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readablemedium produce an article of manufacture including instructions whichimplement the function/act specified in the schematic flowchart diagramsand/or schematic block diagrams block or blocks.

The computer readable program code may also be loaded onto a computer,other programmable data processing apparatus, or other devices to causea series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, otherprogrammable apparatus or other devices to produce a computerimplemented process such that the program code which execute on thecomputer or other programmable apparatus provide processes forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks.

The schematic flowchart diagrams and/or schematic block diagrams in theFigures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation ofpossible implementations of apparatuses, systems, methods and computerprogram products according to various embodiments of the presentinvention. In this regard, each block in the schematic flowchartdiagrams and/or schematic block diagrams may represent a module,segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executableinstructions of the program code for implementing the specified logicalfunction(s).

It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, thefunctions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in theFigures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, beexecuted substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes beexecuted in the reverse order, depending upon the functionalityinvolved. Other steps and methods may be conceived that are equivalentin function, logic, or effect to one or more blocks, or portionsthereof, of the illustrated Figures.

Although various arrow types and line types may be employed in theflowchart and/or block diagrams, they are understood not to limit thescope of the corresponding embodiments. Indeed, some arrows or otherconnectors may be used to indicate only the logical flow of the depictedembodiment. For instance, an arrow may indicate a waiting or monitoringperiod of unspecified duration between enumerated steps of the depictedembodiment. It will also be noted that each block of the block diagramsand/or flowchart diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the blockdiagrams and/or flowchart diagrams, can be implemented by specialpurpose hardware-based systems that perform the specified functions oracts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer readableprogram code.

FIG. 1 depicts one embodiment of a system 100 for securing an electronicdevice 110. An electronic device 110 is any device that can store dataand perform operations for a user. The electronic device 110 may be alaptop computer, a cellular phone, a desktop computer (such as a tower),a personal digital assistant (PDA), a digital book reader, or otherelectronic device.

The electronic device 110 also includes enabling components. An enablingcomponent, as used herein, refers to a physical component that enablesthe electronic device 110 to operate. Those enabling components that aresituated within the electronic device 110 may be referred to as enablingdevice components. Examples of enabling device components include, butare not limited to, basic input output system (BIOS) circuits, uniformextensible firmware interface (UEFI) circuits, hard drives, buscontrollers, computer processing units (CPUs), and other components ofan electronic device 110 without which the electronic device 110 willnot operate.

FIG. 1 also shows a lock 104 that is being used to secure the electronicdevice 110. The lock 104 includes one or more lock components. Forexample, one lock component may be a cable that can be attached topermanent or heavy objects in the surrounding environment (like a pillaror pole). Another lock component may be a locking lug that can be usedsecure the lock 104 to the electronic device 104. Certain lockcomponents of the lock 104 may be situated within the electronic device110. For example, the lock 104 may include a locking lug receptacle thatis situated within the electronic device 110 and that connects to thelocking lug. The lock 104 couples to the electronic device 110 and canput in a locked position, thus securing the electronic device 110. Oneembodiment of a lock 104 is shown and discussed in greater detail inconnection with FIG. 3.

In certain embodiments, the lock 104 includes one or more lockcomponents that are enabling components. As used herein, an enablinglock component is a lock component that enables the electronic device110 to operate. As used herein, the term “operate” means that theelectronic device 110 operates normally and provides access to datastored on the storage device of the electronic device 110. A componentis thus a necessary component if, without that component, the electronicdevice 110 will not operate normally. The electronic device 110 may not,for example, boot without an enabling component.

The lock 104 may be configured to monitor lock components and todetermine whether or not any of the lock components have beencompromised. As used herein, a lock component is compromised if the lockcomponent is, is suspected of being, or is in danger of being, bypassed.

FIG. 2 shows a schematic block diagram showing one possibleconfiguration of a lock 104. The lock 104 may have one or more lockcomponents within the electronic device 110 that allow the lock 104 tosecure the electronic device 110. In one embodiment, the lock 104includes a tamper module 206 and a destruction module 208. The tampermodule 206 monitors one or more lock components of the lock 104 anddetermines whether any lock component is compromised. The destructionmodule 208 destroys an enabling component in response to the tampermodule 206 determining that a lock component is compromised.

In certain embodiments, the destruction module 208 destroys one or moreof the enabling lock components if the tamper module determines that oneof the lock components has been compromised.

FIG. 3 shows one embodiment of a lock 104 that includes a devicesecurity module 302 and a data security module 304. In certainembodiments, the device security module 302 and the data security module304 are enabling lock components.

In certain embodiments, the data security module 104 is designed to fitwithin the outer shell of an electronic device 110. The device securitymodule 302 may be coupled to the electronic device 110 by connecting tothe data security module 304. For example, the data security module 304may fit within the outer shell of a laptop computer. The outer shell ofthe electronic device 110 may provide an aperture that exposes thelocking lug receptacle 324. The user may wrap the cable 332 around afeature, pass the body of the device security module 302 through thecable loop 334, and insert the locking lug 320 into the locking lugreceptacle 324. When the user locks the device security module 302, theelectronic device 110 may be coupled to the device security module 302and the electronic device 110 secured to the particular physicallocation. Other configurations of a device security module 302 can alsobe used to secure the electronic device 110 to a particular physicallocation. The present invention is not limited to the configurationshown in FIG. 3.

FIG. 3 shows the tamper module 206 and the destruction module 208implemented on the device security module 302. In certain embodiments,the tamper module 206 and the destruction module 208 may be implementedon the data security module 304. The tamper module 206 and thedestruction module 208 may also have components on both the devicesecurity module 302 and the data security module 304 such that tamperingwith either can be detected, and such that enabling lock components oneither can be destroyed.

The device security module 302 may also include an authentication codemodule that shares an authentication code with the data security module304. The authentication code module may be realized, in one embodiment,as the radio frequency identification (RFID) transmitter 310. The datasecurity module 304 may be equipped with an RFID receiver 312 thatcommunicates with the RFID transmitter 310. In certain embodiments, thedata security module 304 prevents the electronic device 110 fromoperating if the device security module 302 is uncoupled from theelectronic device 110 or if the authentication code is either incorrect,or has not been provided.

In certain embodiments, the data security module 304 polls the devicesecurity module 302 at intervals for the authentication code. The tampermodule 206 may determine that the device security module 302 has beencompromised if the data security module 304 does not provide the correctauthentication code within an acceptable time period. The devicesecurity module 302 may also push the authentication code. The tampermodule 206 may determine that the data security module 304 iscompromised if the data security module 304 does not acknowledgereceiving the authentication code.

In certain embodiments, the electronic device 110 only works if thedevice security module 302 is coupled to the electronic device 110 viathe data security module 304. In such embodiments, the device securitymodule 302 and the data security module 304 may perform theauthentication check using the authentication code at startup of theelectronic device 110. In embodiments where the electronic device 110will be powered down if the device security module 302 is uncoupled(whether removed or unlocked), it may not be necessary to poll or pushthe authentication code during operation of the electronic device 110 asthe device security module 302 cannot be swapped out without poweringdown the electronic device 110.

While FIG. 3 depicts the RFID transmitter 310 as being in the devicesecurity module 302, and the RFID receiver 312 as being in the datasecurity module 304, the RFID transmitter 310 may be situated in thedata security module 304 and the RFID receiver 312 situated in thedevice security module 302. Similarly, the authentication code modulemay be realized using a variety of different technologies. Theauthentication code module may use Bluetooth or another wirelesscommunication technology. In certain embodiments, the authenticationcode module uses a wired connection to communicate the authenticationcode. For example, the device security module 302 and the data securitymodule 304 may make a wired connection when the locking lug 320 isinserted into the locking lug receptacle 324. This wired connection mayallow the authentication code to be communicated between the devicesecurity module 302 and the data security module 304 using electricalimpulses, light, or other approaches for transmitting data. Theauthentication code module may use the wired connection to transmit theauthentication code to the data security module 304.

In one embodiment, the destruction module 208 destroys either the devicesecurity module 302 or the data security module 304. As used in thisapplication, “destroy” means physically ruining one or more pieces ofhardware such that the device containing the hardware is nonfunctionalwithout replacing or repairing the ruined pieces of hardware. In oneembodiment, the destruction module 208 destroys the device securitymodule 302 by destroying the authentication code module that shares theauthentication code with the data security module 304. The destructionmodule 208 may contain, for example, a surge circuit that is activatedif the tamper module 206 determines that a lock component iscompromised. The surge circuit may cause too much power to flow to theRFID transmitter 310, thereby destroying the RFID transmitter 310. Sincethe RFID transmitter 310 is destroyed, the data security module 304cannot receive the authentication code and the electronic device 110will not operate.

In other embodiments, the destruction module 208 is located in the datasecurity module 304 and destroys the RFID receiver 312. The destructionmodule 208 may destroy the memory that stores the authentication code,causing the authentication code to be lost. The destruction module 208may destroy one or more sensors that enable the data security module 304to detect that the device security module 302 is attached. Thedestruction module 208 may destroy enabling device components such asthe BIOS, bus controllers, the motherboard, memory, the storage medium,or the like in the electronic device 110. Other approaches to destroyingenabling components may also be used. The destruction module 208 mayalso destroy more than one enabling component if the tamper module 206determines that a lock component has been compromised.

The tamper module 206 may monitor the physical status of lock componentsto determine whether any of the lock components are compromised. Thetamper module 206 may monitor the cable 332 to determine whether or notthe cable has been severed. In one embodiment, the cable 332 includes anantenna 340. The antenna 340 may be the antenna used by the RFIDtransmitter 310. In such embodiments, the tamper module 206 may monitorthe resistance of the antenna 340. The tamper module 206 may determinethat the cable 332 has been cut (and thus compromised) by detecting thechange in the resistance of the antenna 340.

The tamper module 206 may also monitor the physical status of other lockcomponents in addition to the cable 332. The tamper module 206 maymonitor the integrity of the device security module 302. In oneembodiment, the tamper module 206 may monitor the integrity of thecasing for the device security module 302, allowing the tamper module206 to determine whether the casing for the device security module 302has been opened and thus compromised. In one embodiment, this detectionis done by filling the interior of the device security module 302 with agas such as nitrogen or carbon dioxide and sealing the casing. Thetamper module 302 may contain an oxygen sensor. In the event that thecasing of the tamper module 302 is opened, the oxygen sensor may detectthe presence of oxygen and determine that the device security module 302has been compromised. Other approaches by which the tamper module 302may monitor lock components and determine whether lock components havebeen compromised may also be used. The tamper module 206 may also haveone or more components in the data security module 304 that determinewhether the data security module 304 has been compromised.

In certain embodiments, the data security module 304 also includes a keymodule 314. The key module 314 may also be implemented on the devicesecurity module 302, or elsewhere in the system. In certain embodiments,the tamper module 206 determining whether a lock component iscompromised involves invoking the key module 314. The key module 314prompts the user for a user key. If the user enters a correct user key,the tamper module 206 may determine that the lock component has not beencompromised. If the user enters an incorrect user key, the tamper module206 may determine that the lock component has been compromised. Thetamper module 206 may invoke the key module 314 if the tamper module 206determines that the physical status of a lock component indicates thatit is compromised.

The key module 314 may open a dialogue box or a special screen on thedisplay of the electronic device 110 to prompt the user for the userkey. The key module 314 may provide the user a limited number ofattempts to enter the correct user key. If the user exceeds thepermissible number of attempts, the key module 314 may report to thetamper module 206 that the user has failed to enter the correct userkey, and the tamper module 206 may conclude that the lock component hasbeen compromised.

They user key is a data value. The user key may be an alpha-numeric codeentered by the user on a keyboard for the electronic device 110. Theuser key may also function as an encryption key that encrypts anddecrypts data stored on the electronic device 110.

Requesting a user key before concluding that a lock component has beencompromised may provide protection from false positives. For example, auser may forget to unlock the electronic device 110 before starting towalk away with it. The yank on the cable 332 may be strong enough toregister as an attempt to tamper with the cable 332. By prompting theuser to input the user key before concluding that the cable 332 has, infact, been tampered with, a measure of confidence is provided before thedestruction module 208 destroys enabling components.

FIG. 4 is an illustration showing the electronic device 110 with a datasecurity module 304 and a device security module 302. As discussed inconnection with FIG. 3, the device security module 304 may be configuredto connect to the data security module 304 and thereby couple to theelectronic device 110 and secure it to a physical location. The devicesecurity module 304 may also share an authentication code with the datasecurity module 304. The device security module 304 may share theauthentication code by pushing the authentication code, pulling theauthentication code, or some combination thereof. The data securitymodule 304 may prevent the electronic device 110 from operating if theauthentication code is either incorrect, or is not provided by thedevice security module 304. The device security module 304 may include atamper module 206 that monitors the device security module 206 and/orthe data security module 304 and determines whether the device securitymodule 304 or the data security module 304 has been compromised. Adestruction module 208 may destroy the device security module 304 and/orthe data security module 304 if the tamper module 206 determines thatone or both are compromised.

The destruction module 208 may destroy the device security module 304 bydestroying an authentication code module that communicates theauthentication code to the data security module 304. The destructionmodule 208 may do so by destroying a transmitter and/or receiver in thedevice security module 304.

The tamper module 206 may monitor a cable 332 of the device securitymodule 304. The tamper module 206 may monitor the cable 332 to determinewhether or not the cable 332 is severed. The tamper module 206 maydetermine that the device security module 304 has been compromised ifthe cable 332 is severed. The destruction module 208 may then destroy anenabling component in response. In certain embodiments, the destructionmodule 208 destroys enabling lock components.

FIG. 5 shows one embodiment of a method 500 for securing an electronicdevice 110. In certain embodiments, the method 500 includes more orfewer steps than those shown. The steps shown in FIG. 5 may also beperformed in an order other than that shown.

The method 500 begins with monitoring 502 lock components of a locksecuring an electronic device 110. If a lock component 504 is notcompromised, the monitoring continues. Determining whether or not a lockcomponent is compromised may involve determining whether a lockcomponent that is a cable 332 has been severed. Other lock componentsmay also be monitored in order to determine whether or not the lockcomponent has been compromised. Determining whether or not a lockcomponent has been compromised may also involve requesting 506 a userkey. A prompt may be displayed on the display of an electronic device.If the user key 508 is correct, the method 500 may conclude that thelock component is not compromised, and the monitoring 502 continues. Ifthe user key is incorrect, the lock component may be deemed compromised.As noted above, the method 500 may involve providing the user with morethan one attempt to enter the correct user key.

If a lock component is compromised, the method 500 includes destroying510 one or more enabling components. As explained above, an enablingcomponent is one that enables the electronic device 110 to operate.Certain components may be both lock components and enabling components.In one embodiment, the device security module 302 is both a lockcomponent and an enabling component. In such embodiments, the methodstep 506 of destroying enabling components may comprise destroying thedevice security module 302. This may be done by destroying anauthentication code module of the device security module 302. In certainembodiments, the electronic device 110 will not operate if theauthentication code module is destroyed.

The embodiments may be practiced in other specific forms. The describedembodiments are to be considered in all respects only as illustrativeand not restrictive. The scope of the invention is, therefore, indicatedby the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description. Allchanges which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of theclaims are to be embraced within their scope.

What is claimed is:
 1. An apparatus comprising: a tamper module thatmonitors one or more lock components of a lock securing an electronicdevice and that determines whether a lock component of the one or morelock components is compromised, the tamper module comprising an oxygensensor sealed within a casing of a device security module containing atleast one of nitrogen and carbon dioxide; a destruction module thatdestroys an enabling component in response to the tamper moduledetermining that the lock component is compromised, wherein an enablingcomponent is a component that enables the electronic device to operate;and a key module that prompts a user for a user key and determineswhether the user key is correct, wherein the tamper module determinesthat the lock component has been compromised if the user key isincorrect, the user key being used to encrypt and decrypt data on theelectronic device.
 2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein one or more ofthe one or more lock components are enabling lock components, wherein anenabling lock component is a lock component that is also an enablingcomponent that enables the electronic device to operate.
 3. Theapparatus of claim 2, wherein the destruction module destroys one ormore enabling lock components in response to the tamper moduledetermining that the lock component is compromised.
 4. The apparatus ofclaim 2, wherein the enabling lock components comprise at least one of:the device security module comprising a cable coupling to the electronicdevice and securing the electronic device to a feature, and sharing anauthentication code with a data security module; and the data securitymodule that prevents the electronic device from operating in response toone or both of: the device security module being uncoupled from theelectronic device; and the authentication code being one of: incorrect;and not provided.
 5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the destructionmodule destroys one of the device security module and the data securitymodule.
 6. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the destruction moduledestroys the device security module by destroying an authentication codemodule that shares the authentication code with the data securitymodule.
 7. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the tamper moduledetermines that the cable is compromised in response to detecting thatthe cable is severed.
 8. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the tampermodule determines that the device security module is compromised inresponse to detecting that the casing for the device security module isopened.
 9. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the destruction moduledestroys a plurality of enabling components in response to the tampermodule determining that the lock component is compromised.
 10. Theapparatus of claim 1, wherein the tamper module invokes the key modulein response to determining that a physical status of the lock componentindicates that the lock component is compromised.
 11. A system forsecuring an electronic device, the system comprising: a device securitymodule that couples to the electronic device and secures the electronicdevice to a physical location, and that shares an authentication codewith a data security module, the device security module comprising acasing containing at least one of nitrogen and carbon dioxide; the datasecurity module that prevents the electronic device from operating inresponse to the authentication code being one of: incorrect; and notprovided; a tamper module that monitors the device security module andthe data security module and that determines whether one of the devicesecurity module and the data security module is compromised, the tampermodule comprising an oxygen sensor sealed within the casing of thedevice security module; a key module that prompts a user for a user keyand determines whether the user key is correct, wherein the tampermodule determines that one of the device security module and the datasecurity module has been compromised if the user key is incorrect, theuser key being used to encrypt and decrypt data on the electronicdevice; and a destruction module that destroys one of the devicesecurity module and the data security module in response to the tampermodule determining that one of the device security module and the datasecurity module is compromised.
 12. The system of claim 11, wherein thedestruction module destroys the device security module by destroying anauthentication code module that communicates the authentication code tothe data security module.
 13. The system of claim 11, wherein the devicesecurity module further comprises a cable.
 14. The system of claim 13,wherein the tamper module determines that the cable is compromised inresponse to detecting that the cable is severed.
 15. The system of claim14, wherein the tamper module monitors a resistance of the cable anddetermines whether the cable is compromised using the resistance. 16.The system of claim 11, further comprising the electronic device,wherein the electronic device is one of a laptop computer, a cellularphone, a desktop computer, and a personal digital assistant (PDA).
 17. Amethod for securing an electronic device, the method comprising:monitoring one or more lock components of a lock securing an electronicdevice; determining whether a lock component of the one or more lockcomponents is compromised, wherein determining whether a lock componentis compromised comprises sensing a presence of oxygen via an oxygensensor within a sealed casing containing at least one of nitrogen andcarbon dioxide; and destroying an enabling component in response todetermining that the lock component is compromised, wherein an enablingcomponent is a component that enables the electronic device to operate.18. The method of claim 17, wherein a device security module thatcouples to the electronic device and secures the electronic device to aphysical location is a lock component and an enabling component.
 19. Themethod of claim 18, wherein destroying the enabling component comprisesdestroying the device security module.
 20. The system of claim 11,wherein the tamper module determines that the device security module iscompromised in response to sensing a presence of oxygen.